Abstract-Recently, Shen, Shi, and Waters introduced the notion of predicate privacy, and proposed a scheme that achieves predicate privacy in the symmetric-key settings. In this paper, we propose two schemes. In the first scheme, we extend PEKS to support predicate privacy based on the idea of randomization. To the best of our knowledge, this is the first work that ensures predicate privacy in the public-key settings without requiring interactions between the receiver and potential senders, the size of which may be very large. Moreover, we identify a new type of attacks against PEKS, i.e., statistical guessing attacks. Accordingly, we introduce a new notion called statistics privacy, i.e., the property that predicate privacy is preserved even when the statistical distribution of keywords is known. The second scheme we proposed makes a tradeoff between statistics privacy and storage efficiency (of the delegate). Compared to PEKS, both schemes introduce reasonable communication and computation overheads and can be smoothly deployed in existing systems.
I. INTRODUCTION Public-key Encryption with Keyword Search (PEKS) introduced by Boneh et al. [1] is the first practical asymmetric searchable encryption scheme, as well as the first predicate encryption scheme. It is originally designed for the purpose of intelligent email routing. For example, as shown in Figure 1 , a user R may receive emails through different devices, e.g., a PDA or a desktop. R want to selectively forward emails with certain keywords to a specific device, e.g., emails that contain "agenda" are forwarded to the PDA. To protect data confidentiality, emails are encrypted at the sender side. Hence, the mail server G has no access to the content of emails. To delegate G the capability of performing selective forwarding, G is assigned a set of trapdoors that are corresponding to keywords that might be used for searching at a later time. For a keyword x, the corresponding trapdoor t(x) is generated from the master secret held only by R and is used to define a predicate p. Upon receiving a ciphertext, G can verify if the corresponding plaintext containing x based on the predicate.
Most previous works on predicate encryption concentrate on plaintext privacy, i.e., the property that ciphertexts reveal no information about the encrypted data to any party without the private key other than what is inherently revealed by the trapdoors. However, researchers also identified a few other security/privacy issues relevant to PEKS [2] , [3] , [4] , [5] . One major concern is to limit the delegate's capability of keyword searching within a certain time frame [2] , [4] . Another important concern is that PEKS is subject to offline keyword guessing attacks identified by Byun et al [3] . Later, Shen et al. formalized the second concern and introduced the notion of predicate privacy [5] , i.e., the property that t(x) reveals no information about the encoded predicate p. They also proposed a encryption scheme that can achieve both plaintext privacy and predicate privacy in the symmetric-key settings. Moreover, Shen et al. claimed that it is inherently impossible to achieve predicate privacy in the public-key setting, such as PEKS. Interesting though, several researchers had actually proposed a few solutions to this problem [2] , [4] . However, their claim may be based on an implicit assumption that the proposed solution should not conflict with one of the aims of PEKS, i.e., making keyword search possible without interactions between the receiver and potential senders [2] . Such an assumption is definitely reasonable, since in practice the size of potential senders could be a huge number. Moreover, the proposed solutions [2] , [4] require to share some secret, in the form of either a set of public keys of the receiver [4] or the method of refreshing keywords [2] , [4] , between senders and the receiver. Considering the huge number of potential senders, the overhead of synchronizing the secret and protecting it from disclosure is overwhelming. Formally, the predicate p of the equality test in PEKS can be defined as p(e(x), t(x)) = 1, in which x is the keyword, e(x) is the encryption of x, and t(x) is the trapdoor derived from x and R's private key. The mail server G is usually considered semi-trusted [6] . Since the public-key encryption function does not require a secret key, G can encrypt any plaintext of her choice and then evaluate the resulting ciphertext with the trapdoors assigned by R. By verifying whether the resulting ciphertext satisfies the predicate associating with a trapdoor, G learns if the chosen plaintext is equal to the keyword that is corresponding to the trapdoor. In other words, G can launch an attack similar to brute-force password attacks. In particular, PEKS is especially fragile to this type of attacks in applications where a small set of keywords are frequently used, such as "Urgent" and "Classified". In this paper, we refer this type of attacks as brute-force guessing attacks.
Besides brute-force guessing attacks, the mail server G may make use of external knowledge about the statistical distribution of keywords to identify the relation between a trapdoor/predicate and a keyword. We call it statistical guessing attack. For example, in an application the probabilities that a keyword x and any other keyword are used are 20% and less than 10%. G can easily deduce the trapdoor corresponding to x by simply counting the number that each trapdoor is matched. Note that, the method of refreshing keywords by appending the time period before the encryption is still subject to this type of attacks, because it does not change the statistical distribution of keywords within the same time period. To define the problem more accurately, we introduce a new notation, called statistics privacy, i.e., the property that predicate privacy is preserved even when the statistical distribution of keywords is known.
In this paper, we proposed the PEKSrand scheme to provide strong privacy protection in PEKS. PEKSrand has two variants: PEKSrand-BG and PEKSrand-SG. Both variants are robustly against brute-force guessing attacks, and thus can ensure predicate privacy when the statistical distribution of keywords to be searched is unknown. Compared to PEKSrand-BG, PEKSrand-SG can further mitigate statistical guessing attacks at the cost of the storage overhead on the delegate, e.g., the mail server in the intelligent email routing application. According to our analysis and experimental results, both schemes introduce reasonable communication and computation overheads and can be smoothly deployed in existing systems. To the best of our knowledge, this is the first work that ensures predicate privacy in the public-key settings without requiring interactions between the receiver and potential senders.
The remainder parts of this paper are organized as follows. In Section II, we present the basic ideas of our solutions. The PEKSrand-BG and PEKSrand-SG schemes are presented in Section III and Section IV, respectively. Afterwards, we present the analysis on security and privacy of PEKSrand in Section V. The efficiency analysis and simulation results are presented in Section VI, followed by the related work in Section VII. We draw the conclusion in Section VIII.
II. BASIC IDEAS OF OUR SOLUTIONS
We observe that, PEKS's incompetence in ensuring predicate privacy is due to two facts. On the one hand, the keywords used to create trapdoors in the targeted applications are meaningful dictionary words. On the other hand, there exists a deterministic and direct one-to-one mapping between a searching keyword and the corresponding trapdoor.
Based on this observation, our first idea is to randomize the original keywords. Hence, the transformed keywords used to generate the trapdoors are not meaningful dictionary words any more. Meanwhile, the deterministic and direct one-to-one mappings are avoided. A naïve solution is that, the receiver and all senders share a secret, which is concatenated with original keywords (e.g., the key refreshing solution [2] ) or is used as the key for hashing original keywords. However, such privacy protection is frail, since the protection of the shared secret is difficult given that the size of the set of senders is usually large. Moreover, it is also not suitable for scenarios where the membership of the set of senders might be dynamic, which results in additional costs of key/secret management. To address above issues, we limit the entities that hold the secret used for randomization to only one or a few proxy servers, which are well protected and thus are more secure than normal senders. The PEKSrand-BG Scheme is built upon the first idea.
Another idea is to spread out the statistical distribution of keywords by mapping a keyword to multiple trapdoors instead of one. It can weaken the effectiveness of statistical guessing attacks at the cost of the increasing overhead of storing trapdoors at the delegate. The PEKSrand-SG Scheme is developed through a combination of both ideas. In the previous example, it is much more difficult for the mail server to guess when the probabilities that a trapdoor mapped to keyword x and a trapdoor mapped to any other keyword are matched are 2% and no more than 1%, given that the same number of keyword matching events are observed. Apparently, when the mail server observes a sufficient number of events, it can still figure out the mappings between trapdoors and keywords. Hence, we have to refresh such mappings before it happens.
In our design, besides the three types of entities in the original PEKS system, we add a new type of entities called proxy server. To avoid confusions, we denote searching server and proxy server as gateway and proxy, respectively.
We assume that, both the proxy and the gateway are semitrusted in the sense that they follow the defined protocol step by step but are willing to learn any information that leaked during execution. In other words, they do not launch active attacks (e.g., probe-response attacks [7] , [8] ) or collude with any malicious user, unless being compromised. We also assume that there exist certain security mechanisms that can detect the compromise of any proxy or the gateway and recover it within a short period. i.e., although the adversary is capable of compromising the gateway or a proxy, she cannot control both all proxies and the gateway at the same time. We argue that it is reasonable in practice, in particular in PEKSrand-SG, where a set of proxies instead of one are used.
III. THE PEKSRAND-BG SCHEME
The framework of the PEKSrand-BG scheme is illustrated in Figure 2 . We denote the receiver and the sender as Alice and Bob, respectively. Now, Bob wants to send a message to Alice, who relies on the gateway to route the incoming messages based on the keywords contained in the messages. In PEKSrand-BG, to be resistant to brute-force guessing attacks, Alice transforms the original meaningful keywords by using a secret during the trapdoor generation. To guarantee that the searching function is still workable with randomized keywords, we employ a proxy which sits between senders and the gateway. The proxy's major responsibility is to preprocess the PEKS ciphertexts received from the senders before forwarding them. We follows Boneh et al.'s construction of PEKS [1] , which leverages two cyclic groups G 1 , G 2 of a prime order p, a bilinear map e : G 1 ×G 1 → G 2 , and two hash functions
log p . The detailed procedures of EKSrand-BG are as follows.
• KeyGen(s): Alice picks a random number α ∈ Z * p and a generator g of G 1 , and then outputs a public/private key pair
At the end of this step, Alice sends k −1 to the proxy through a secure channel between Alice and the proxy;
• T rapdoor(A priv , x, k): Given the private key A priv = α, the secret k and a keyword x, Alice produces the trapdoor
α * k and delivers it to the gateway through another secure channel between Alice and the gateway;
• P EKS(A pub , x): For a keyword x, Bob first picks a random number r ∈ Z * p , and computes t = e(H 1 (x), h r ) ∈ G 2 , then outputs the PEKS ciphertext S = [g r , H 2 (t)]. Thereafter, the PEKS ciphertext S is sent to the proxy;
• P EKSrand(S, k −1 ): The proxy updates each PEKS ciphertext S received with the multiplicative inverse k −1 . More precisely, the transformed PEKS ciphertext (i.e., the PEKSrand ciphertext) is calculated as S = [g r * k
Afterwards, the proxy forwards S to the gateway.
•
If so, then it is a match otherwise it is not match.
IV. THE PEKSRAND-SG SCHEME Although PEKSrand-BG is efficient and can defend bruteforce guessing attacks, we still have two concerns about it. In PEKSrand-BG, we raise the threshold of breaking the system through compromising online server(s) from a single gateway in PEKS to two servers (i.e., a gateway and a proxy). However, in security-critical scenarios, we want to further raise the bar. The other concern is that, PEKSrand-BG is still vulnerable to statistical guessing attacks, since the indirect one-to-one mapping between the original keyword and the new trapdoor still preserved. Hence, the appearance frequency of a specific keyword is still the same as the corresponding trapdoor or predicate, so PEKSrand-BG fails to protect statistics privacy.
For the first concern, a naïve solution of maintaining a few proxies holding the same secret k −1 does not work. Even worse, it actually increases the risk of server compromises. Therefore, we think about increasing both the number of proxies and the number of secrets stored among the set of proxies. As to the second concern, our solution is to transform the one-to-one mapping, either direct or indirect, between a keyword and its trapdoor into a one-to-many mapping. To address these two concerns, in PEKSrand-SG we employ a combination of two methods: Proxy Farm and Random Walk.
A proxy farm consists of U proxies, each of which stores a distinct multiplicative inverse. In a simple application of this proxy farm method, the proxy performs ciphertext transformation with its own multiplicative inverse upon receiving a PEKS ciphertext. The operation is the same as in PEKSrand-BG. Afterwards, the proxy forwards the resulting PEKSrand ciphertext to the gateway. In such a scheme, the PEKSrand ciphertexts corresponding to the same keyword are verified by distinct trapdoors at the gateway, if they are generated by different proxies. In other words, the original one-toone mapping has been converted into a one-to-F mapping, where mapping factor F is the number of trapdoors that are mapped to a single keyword. Hence, the storage overhead at the gateway is increased by a factor of F . In addition, we need U = F proxies in the proxy farm. Although the storage overhead at the gateway is acceptable in practice (Please refer to Section VI-B for details), it is costly to maintain a proxy farm with a large size, considering the level of security protection and trust level required. To mitigate this overhead, we integrate the idea of random walk into the proxy farm. Now, a ciphertext will be transformed multiple times with distinct inverses instead of only once before it is finally forwarded to the gateway. Let u denotes the number of times that a ciphertext is transformed with distinct inverses. In such a new method, with a proxy farm with size U , we can achieve the same level of privacy protection as that is provided by a proxy farm with size C u U in the simple application of this proxy farm method. The framework of PEKSrand-SG, which incorporates the ideas of proxy farm and random walk, is shown in Figure 3 .
The PEKSrand-SG scheme consists of the four phases: setup, encrypt, random-walk, and keyword-searching.
1) Setup:
To initialize, the following system-wide parameters are defined: U is the number of proxies that form the proxy farm, and u is the number of distinct proxies involved in a random walk; the security parameter s determines the size, p, of the groups G 1 and G 2 , and e is a bilinear pairing between two groups and defined as e : G 1 ×G 1 → G 2 . Similar to PEKSrand-BG, to generate a system wide public key pair, Alice picks a random α ∈ Z * p and a generator g of G 1 , and outputs A pub = [g, h = g α ] and A priv = α. 2) Encrypt: In the encrypt phase of PEKSrand-SG, Bob encrypts the keyword x in the same way as in PEKSrand-BG and outputs the PEKS ciphertext S = [g r , H 2 (t)]. Afterwards, S is forwarded to a randomly chosen proxy in the proxy farm.
3) Random-Walk: Without loss of generality, we assume that proxy P 1 is the first proxy receiving the PEKS ciphertext S and P 1 holds the inverse k 1 , H 2 (t)]. Then, proxy P 1 generates a < E 1 , S 1 > pair and forwards it to a randomly chosen proxy in the farm other than itself. E 1 is the index of the multiplicative inverse held by proxy P 1 in the format of a string (i.e., "1" in this case), Without loss of generality, we assume that the path of the random walk within the proxy farm is P 1 → P 2 → . . . → P u , and proxy P i holds a multiplicative inverse k
−1 i
for i = 1, 2, . . . , u. For the following random walk process, we denote the PEKSrand ciphertext pair that a proxy P i receives from another proxy as < E x , S x = [g r * k
x , H 2 (t)] > where x represents the number of proxies that have performed a transformation on the ciphertext so far during the random walk. Proxy P i first checks whether the index of its multiplicative inverse is indicated in E x . If it is true, it means that proxy P i has previously performed a transformation on this ciphertext. Thereafter, P i simply forwards the received pair to a randomly chosen proxy without any modification. Otherwise, proxy P i will update the pair as
where E x+1 is the concatenation of E x and the index of the multiplicative inverse of P i , separated by the predefined delimiter. Afterwards, proxy P i checks the number of the indexes of inverses that appear in E x+1 . If it is less than u, P i forwards the pair to a randomly chosen proxy in the farm other than itself. If it is equal to u, the random walk process is complete, and proxy P i will forward the < E u , S u > pair to the gateway.
4) Keyword-Searching:
The whole trapdoor set that Alice assigns to the gateway can be divided into C u U subsets. Each subset contains d trapdoors for d keywords that Alice chooses and is corresponding to a unique combination of u proxies. Each subset can be labeled with the corresponding I j for j ∈ {1, 2, . . . , u}. Upon receiving a < E u , S u > pair from the last hop of the proxy farm, we may first identify the subset of trapdoors instead of searching the whole trapdoor set. The subset is corresponding to the combination of proxies that have performed the transformation operation on the ciphertext. It can be done by simply comparing X u with the I j 's of subsets that the gateway receives from Alice.
Once the subset is determined, the gateway performs the searching in the same way as in PEKSrand-BG. Let 
V. SECURITY AND PRIVACY ANALYSIS

A. Security Analysis
The security of both PEKSrand schemes relies on the difficulty of the Elliptic Curve DLP: suppose g x and g
(resp. g x * k ) are two points on an elliptic curve where both k −1 (respectively, k) and x are scalars. Given g x and g
(resp. g x * k ), it is computationally infeasible to obtain k
is sufficiently large. In PEKSrand-BG, in order to break the system, e.g., compromising data confidentiality, the adversary has to compromise both the gateway and the proxy. In PEKSrand-SG, the protection is further enhanced in the sense that the adversary has to compromise both the gateway and at least u proxies.
B. Privacy Analysis
As an extension of PEKS, both variants of PEKSrand inherit PEKS's capability of ensuring plaintext privacy. Hence, we limit privacy analysis to the protection of predicate privacy against brute-force and statistical guessing attacks. In addition, both attacks require the knowledge of trapdoors, which is only held by the receiver and the semi-trusted gateway. Therefore, we focus on privacy protection against the gateway.
1) Protection against Brute-force Guessing Attacks:
The root cause of brute-force guessing attacks against PEKS is that, a predicate represents a deterministic and direct mapping between a keyword and the trapdoor. In both variants of PEKSrand, such a mapping is changed. More specifically, the mapping represented by a predicate is neither deterministic (i.e., a keyword is randomized before generating the trapdoor), nor direct (i.e., the mapping between the original keyword and the trapdoor is indirect, although there exists a direct mapping between the randomized keyword and the trapdoor).
2) Protection against Statistical Guessing Attacks:
With extra knowledge of the statistical distribution of keywords, either direct or indirect mapping can be revealed by statistical guessing attacks. It can be achieved by first recording the history of trapdoor matching. Then compares the frequency of a specific keyword, which is obtained from the knowledge, with the history that each trapdoor has been matched.
Since it is not feasible to limit senders' keyword usage, in PEKSrand-SG, we mitigate the observed matched frequency of trapdoors during keyword searching at the gateway side. Suppose p x denotes the probability that keyword x or the corresponding trapdoor T x is used.
By setting parameters (U, u), the mapping factor F = C u U , so keyword x has F corresponding trapdoors instead of one.
x } denote the set of trapdoors corresponding to the keyword x, and x is mapped to one of F trapdoors in T x evenly with probability p x = px F . Intuitively, given the same number of total successful trapdoor matching, it is more difficult to distinguish two events with the statistical probability of px F and py F (e.g., 2% and 1%) than p x and p y (e.g., 20% and 10%).
Nonetheless, careful readers may notice that the gateway is still able to launch statistical guessing attacks when observes a sufficient successful matching. To address this issue, we need to perform periodical secret refreshments, i.e., executing the setup phase in PEKSrand-SG after reaching a predetermined number of successful trapdoor matchings, which we call the refreshing threshold. Apparently, there exists a tradeoff between privacy and efficiency. The entropy analysis and probability analysis (In this paper, the analysis are not included due to space limit; interested readers may refer to [9] for details) show that by slightly increasing the number of proxies, the refreshing threshold can be improved significantly. For example, in our case study [9] , when the setting of random walking is (U, u) = (5, 2), the maximum refreshing threshold is only 53. By simply increasing the number of proxies to 10 and 11, the maximum refreshing threshold is increased to 1367 and 2507, respectively. We argue that, such refreshing thresholds are sufficient for many real applications.
C. Resistant to On-line Guessing Attacks
As an improvement, PEKSrand is robust against off-line guessing attacks. Unfortunately, it does not guard against online guessing attacks, in that theoretically the semi-trusted (or intruded) gateway can act as a normal sender, by sending the PEKS chipertext of a keyword of her choice. Then she can receive the corresponding PEKSrand ciphertext from proxy server(s), and use it to test against possessed trapdoors.
In reality, these attacks can be prevented easily, since the semi-trusted (or intruded) gateway is required to operate online. Therefore, we can constrain her on-line activities by deploying misbehavior monitors such as Process Monitor [10] . In addition, since the gateway is reluctant to append identity information to avoid trace back, it baffles her to distinguish probes from other ciphertexts, considering the huge volume of traffic passing the gateway 24/7. Moreover, an important server, such as the gateway in PEKSrand, is usually properly protected by various security mechanisms such as IDS. Hence, an on-line intruder is usually captured at the early stage of attacks, and the server can be recovered shortly if needed. We also suggest performing secret and trapdoor refreshment after recovery, in case trapdoors are leaked for further attacks.
VI. EFFICIENCY ANALYSIS AND EMPIRICAL RESULTS Our PEKSrand implementation leverages the Identity Based Encryption [11] implemented in the MIRACL library [12] . We adopt the well-known Tate Pairing. A 512-bit prime p is used for effective 1024-bit security, and G 1 and G 2 are groups on the elliptic curve y 2 = x 3 + x mod p with 160-bit group order q = 2 159 + 2 17 + 1, a prime which divides p. We simulate on a desktop with Intel 2.13GHz CPU and 2GB RAM. The programs run on Windows XP Professional OS with ADO database connection to a MS SQL 2000 server.
A. Computation Overhead
Compared to PEKS, in terms of computation, PEKSrand-BG introduces only one additional exponential calculation per ciphertext at the proxy. In PEKSrand-SG, similarly, each proxy involved in the random walk process performs only one additional exponential calculation per ciphertext.
Note that, the number of trapdoor matching that the gateway needs to perform in PEKSrand-SG is the same as that of the original PEKS. It is due to the fact that, the trapdoor matching process is limited to a subset that contains d elements, where d is the number of keywords that Alice chooses. More specifically, the gateway needs to perform d 2 trapdoor matching operation on average. Hence, the only additional operation at the gateway is to identify the subset that should be subject to the following trapdoor matching operation.
On our testbed, an exponential multiplication and a trapdoor matching operation take 5 and 13 milliseconds, respectively. And the operation of identifying a subset is very efficient. It takes only 15 milliseconds when F = 462, i.e., (U, u) = (11, 5) . Therefore, compared to PEKS, the computation overhead in the PEKSrand schemes is negligible. Moreover, given a reasonable size of keywords to be searched, the actual computation overhead is small in most real world applications. Table I shows the simulation results. The sample set we used are 256 keywords extracted from the Enron Email Dataset [13] . For each round, we randomly choose 50 out of 256 keywords and encrypt them. We record both # T est , the number of trapdoor matching operations performed to identify all 50 keywords, and T T ime , the exact time used at the gateway to complete the keyword matching process. The results shown in Table I are the averages of 50 rounds.
B. Storage Overhead
In comparison with PEKS, PEKSrand-BG has the same storage overhead at the gateway, and the overhead is increased by a factor of F in PEKSrand-SG. In our implementation, to achieve effective 1024-bit security, the size of a trapdoor is 128 bytes. Thus, given that there are 256 keywords in our simulation, the total storage overheads of PEKSrand-BG and PEKSrand-SG at the gateway's side are 32768 bytes and 32768*F bytes, respectively. We argue that, the storage overhead of PEKSrand-SG is still acceptable in many real world applications, considering that nowadays it is common that the hard drives of a server have the capacity of 1TB or more [14] . For example, in the intelligent email routing application, a gateway with 1TB storage can support more than 2 13 users, given that F = 462 and the number of keywords that each user specified is 2 8 on average.
C. Communication Overhead
If we view the proxy in PEKSrand-BG or the proxy farm in PEKSrand-SG as a transparent component between the sender and the gateway, there is no additional traffic generated in the PEKSrand schemes. It is due to the fact that, the same number and size of ciphertexts are transmitted, although the content of packets are changed. However, the PEKSrand schemes indeed introduce some delay due to the ciphertext transformation and random walking within the proxy farm. Fortunately, as shown in Section VI-A, the ciphertext transformation operation is lightweight. In addition, our analysis shows that only a small u, e.g., 4 or 5, is sufficient to satisfy the privacy requirement of most real world applications [9] .
Compared to PEKS, the communication loads between a receiver and the gateway is increased by C u U − 1 times in PEKSrand-SG. It is caused by delivering trapdoors in both the setup phase and periodical secret refreshments. However, as we presented in Section V-B2, the frequency of the refreshment is reasonable small for most real world applications.
VII. RELATED WORK
The development of PEKS boosts many useful applications such as secure searchable remote email storage [15] . However, recent research on attacks against PEKS [2] , [3] , [4] , [5] may discourage the usages of PEKS in real world applications.
Baek et al. first brought the attention to the unlimited capability of keyword matching once the delegate is assigned the trapdoors [2] . They proposed to refresh the keywords by attaching time period information before performing the PEKS encryption. Later, Abdalla et al. proposed the public-key encryption with temporary keyword search (PETKS) scheme that aims at the same issue [4] . Two constructions are given. One is to generate a different key pair of the receiver for each time period. The other is the same as the one proposed by Baek et al [2] . Both works [2] , [4] require interactions between the receiver and a large number of potential senders, and thus is impractical for real-world applications.
Byun et al. found that PEKS is susceptible to the offline keyword guessing attack, which is equivalent to the brute-force guessing attack defined in this paper. They claimed that anyone (insider/outside) can launch such attacks. However, such a claim is based on the assumption that the attacker can capture the valid trapdoor. They did not propose any countermeasure against the attack. Afterwards, Shen et al. formalized this type of attacks and defined predicate privacy in the context of predicate encryption system. They also gave a predicate privacy-preserving construction in the symmetric key setting for the inner-product predicate [5] .
VIII. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we identified a new type of attacks against the PEKS scheme (i.e., statistical guessing attacks) and proposed the PEKSrand scheme that aims at protecting predicate privacy and statistics privacy, which is a new concept introduced by us. Both variants of the PEKSrand scheme can prevent brute-force guessing attacks. However, only the PEKSrand-SG scheme can be used to mitigate statistical guessing attacks at the cost of a higher storage overhead at the gateway or delegate. According to our analysis and experimental results, both schemes introduce reasonable communication and computation overheads and can be smoothly deployed in existing systems.
